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The implications for cyber security have been immense but I would like to took a little bit wider and examine some aspects of the resilience of the IT-driven systems of systems, which increasingly support our modern lives. This has been brought to mind by the publication of the National Infrastructure Commission\'s (NIC) report entitled *Anticipate, React, Recover: Resilient Infrastructure Systems.* Of course, the NIC is only concerned with economic infrastructure; however, its recommendations are general enough to apply to many other sectors in which information and communications technology (and its security) is an essential pillar of its success.

'Take the 'face up to uncomfortable truths' mantra and apply it to the current pandemic... It is an essential precursor to adequate resilience.'
================================================================================================================================================

The 'anticipate' phase is characterised in the report by the idea that the architecture of systems of systems needs to better anticipate future shocks and stresses by facing up to uncomfortable truths. The 'react' phase looks to improve the ability to resist, absorb and recover from shocks and stresses by effective stress testing for vulnerabilities and addressing them.

Finally, the 'recover' recommendations are more all-encompassing and and include valuing resilience property and ensuring that the national resilience framework drives adaptation in a timely fashion.

All of this sounds like the sort of thing that you would expect, if you were trying to manage systemic risk to any system of systems, so why is it necessary for this eminent commission to say it now? Take the 'face up to uncomfortable truths' mantra and apply it to the current pandemic.

We are told that pandemic has been the most highly-ranked risk in both likelihood and impact in the UK National Risk Register for a significant period. Admittedly, this is for influenza pandemics but, alongside this risk, the document lists the risk of novel infectious diseases and, perhaps with hindsight, it is difficult to see why the risk was not just combined as highly transmittable infectious diseases. Added to the elevated position on the risk register, the 2016 government pandemic exercise took place and apparently showed many of the problems faced in our reaction to Covid-19. This is where the 'face up to uncomfortable truths' comes in. It is an essential precursor to adequate resilience.

So where should we be facing up to these truths? Two obvious places are in major exercises and infrastructure stress tests but, as we have seen, the lessons identified may well not be acted on --- probably for several 'good' relatively short-term expedient reasons. Similarly, the lessons identified in major retrospective inquiries into disaster events could help us face up to uncomfortable truths if they were timely enough to drive adaptation and improve resilience. However, timeliness is not a normal feature of major disaster inquiries.

You\'ll notice that I haven\'t mentioned much about the react and recover phases; this is because I wanted to deal with the need to face up to uncomfortable truths, which I think underpins all of the rest. The NIC report is well worth a read and its recommendations are undoubtedly applicable to the resilience of all types of systems of systems.

Maybe the recommendations will be acted on this time.
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**p38-39:** Twenty years ago, millions of people fell victim to the Love Bug worm. Prof Steven Furnell FBCS looks back at the incident and considers how things have changed since.
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**P40-41:** Reza Alavi MBCS, Chair of BCS Information Risk Management and Assurance Group (IRMA) looks at getting the cyber basics right when working from home.
